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ABSTRACT The paper compares the political leadership of Silvio Berlusconi 
and Viktor Orbán from the beginning of their political careers to 2014, Besides 
giving a descriptive comparison of the Italian and Hungarian political leaders, 
the paper focuses on two questions: (1) the nature of their populism; (2) the quality 
and robustness of the changes induced by their policy. The paper concludes that 
both leaders introduced a new era in politics, but Orbán has been more effective 
in transforming policy means and priorities and also in adjusting the institutional 
settings (polity). Unlike Berlusconi, he has become a founder of a new regime; a 
democracy with authoritarian elements. Both of them are populist leaders in terms 
of substance, as well as process and linkage, but the ideological nature of their 
populism is rather different. While Berlusconi represents liberal populism, Orbán 
represents an illiberal one.
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Silvio Berlusconi and Viktor Orbán, the Italian and Hungarian political 
leaders, have often been criticized in the European press and also in the political 
science literature for their populist style, extravagant behavior, and even for 
authoritarian elements in their politics. Although the literature devotes little 
attention to comparing their figures, and there are few references portraying 
them as similar populist leaders (Conversi, 2013; Mudde, 2015; Palonen, 2009, 
p. 329), leading European newspapers have regularly drawn a parallel between 
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them. For example, The Economist warned EU politicians that they should not 
repeat the ‘Berlusconi mistake’ in the case of Orbán, thus they should ‘condemn 
Mr. Orbán’s anti-democratic behavior loudly and clearly’ (The Economist, 2012). 
Others have noted that Orbán is a ‘populist who learns fast’ and ‘wants to become 
another Silvio Berlusconi’ (Spiegel Online, 2010). Similarly, European politicians 
like Sigmar Gabriel and Gianni Pittella have drawn attention to their comparable 
practices. Pittella remarks, ‘We all remember Berlusconi’s years. (…) Hungary is a 
great country and deserves better than this’ (Socialists & Democrats, 2015), while 
Gabriel suggests that the European People’s Party should stop its cooperation with 
the parties of Berlusconi and Orbán, pointing out that ‘it is wrong to make the fate 
of the European Union dependent on these two parties’ (Reuters, 2014).
Although they may seem to be the straw men in the European political 
discourse, they are heavyweights in Italian and Hungarian politics. As well as 
with some of the superficial references in their political discourse, there are 
several striking similarities between these two political leaders. Both Berlusconi 
and Orbán have served as prime minister for long periods, carried out major 
institutional reforms, applied innovative campaign techniques, and presented 
charismatic profiles as the leaders of not only their own parties, but practically 
of the whole right side of the political spectrum. 
Following an ancient strategy described in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives, our aim 
is to compare the achievement of these political leaders. Plutarch compared 
biographies of famous men, arranging them in tandem. He tried to illuminate the 
impact that their moral virtues or failings had on their records as a great men or 
as statesmen. Our goal is slightly different and more modest: it is to focus on the 
achievements of Berlusconi and Orbán as individual political leaders.  Political 
leadership might be defined as an unmistakable personal impact on politics and 
policies. In the words of an Austrian political scientist, Anton Pelinka (1995, 2), 
’Leadership exists if politics and policies without a certain person’s participation 
would be decidedly different’. We assume that Berlusconi and Orbán have been 
not just incumbents, but real political leaders in this sense. In fact, they have 
changed the nature of democratic politics in their own countries, even if the 
direction and quality of these changes are controversial and highly debated. 
Thus, the aim of our paper is primarily to compare and describe their 
leadership achievements. We would like to highlight the similarities and 
differences between Berlusconi and Orbán by exploring the nature and scope of 
the political changes inspired and carried out by these political leaders in each 
country. We concentrate on the direction and the robustness of the changes they 
have carried out. Our aim is to say whether their politics have brought similarly 
deep changes in the fields of policy, ideology and institutions, beyond the 
superficial similarity of their extravagant, populist leadership style and rhetoric. 
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We answer this question through investigating two analytical areas using a 
descriptive comparison. First, in what sense and to what extent can Berlusconi 
and Orbán be characterized as populist leaders? The application of the concept of 
populism in a nuanced manner will help to refine the assumptions of the existing 
literature. The second question is concerned with the scope and the direction of 
the changes. In order to map them, we use the concepts of presidentialization 
(Poguntke-Webb 2005) and anti-liberalism/illiberalism (Zakaria 1997). We 
assume that these concepts are adequate means for grasping important aspects 
of the changes which have occurred. 
The article is organized as follows: First, we introduce the conceptual 
framework that supports two analytical questions regarding populism and the 
scope and direction of changes. The second part is devoted to a descriptive 
comparison of the political activity of Berlusconi and Orbán. In this section 
we analyze four areas, which cover the three classical dimensions of polity, 
politics and policy: first, their effect on the party system and on the political 
spectrum (politics); second, the applied political means (politics); third, the 
transformation of the governmental structure (polity); and fourth, governmental 
goals and policy. Finally, we return to the analytical questions and summarize 
the conclusions of the comparison. Our main finding is that both leaders have 
opened a new era in Italian and Hungarian politics, but based on the scope and 
depth of the changes, Orbán is also a founder of a new political regime.
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS
In the following section we expound on the conceptual framework of the 
major questions of this essay.
Populism 
Our first question refers to the general assumption in the literature regarding 
the populist nature of the leaderships of Berlusconi and Orbán. We would like 
to further clarify the following question: in what sense and to what extent 
can Berlusconi and Orbán be characterized as populist leaders (Bozóki 2008; 
Pappas 2014; Pasquino 2005)? To answer the question, we use the concept of 
populism in three different senses: (1) as an ideology (substance); (2) as process 
and linkage; and (3) as constitutional politics. 
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Firstly, there is wide consensus in the literature that populism as an ideology 
includes the following elements: (1) an assumption of a central antagonistic 
relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’; (2) an attempt to give power 
back to the people and restore popular sovereignty; and (3) a perception of 
the people as a homogeneous unity (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004; Mény and 
Surel 2002). In addition, populism often involves announcing a serious crisis, 
claiming a central position for the leader who embodies the will of the people, 
and conducting adversarial politics; i.e., a strategy of polarization. Besides this, 
however, populism is ‘empty’ as a substance. It is, using the concept developed 
by Michael Freeden, a ‘thin-centred’ ideology, which can be attached willy-
nilly to any left- or right-wing political ideas (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2014). 
Secondly, regarding the concept of populism as process and linkage we 
rely on the work of Peter Mair. Populism in this sense is a form of democratic 
governance that operates without an emphasis on party, where the relationship 
between voters and government is unmediated (Mair 2002: 88—89). There is an 
increased reliance on plebiscitarian techniques of winning support. 
Thirdly, we introduce a constitutional-institutional dimension of populism. 
While Mair focused on the linkage and mediation between party leaders and 
followers, particularly in the process of mobilization and political will-formation, 
we also reflect on the mode of linkage at the constitutional and governmental 
level. Populist democracy as a constitutional system includes means like recall, 
public initiative, referendum and/or direct elections of public office-holders. 
We are interested in gauging the extent to which Berlusconi and Orbán used 
already existing means of direct democracy in their political practice, and 
also the extent to which they introduced or tried to introduce additional direct 
democratic institutions at the constitutional level.
The scope and direction of changes 
The second question addressed in this essay focuses on the direction of 
changes that have taken place in the Berlusconi and Orbán era. The concepts 
of personalization, presidentialization and liberalism/illiberalism will be used 
to understand the direction of changes. First, personalization refers to the 
increasing role of political leaders vis-à-vis traditional party structures and 
in electoral competition (Blondel et al. 2010; Karvonen 2010). Second, we 
understand the de facto presidentialization of politics to be the strengthening 
of power resources and political autonomy of incumbent leaders in three 
central arenas of democratic politics and government: within the executive 
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(executive face), the political party (party face), and when personalization 
increases in electoral politics at the same time (electoral face). The process of 
presidentialization is strengthened by factors other than those deriving from 
the formal constitutional structure (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 5). Third, the 
concepts of liberalism and illiberalism are used in a conventional sense within 
the context of liberal democracies. By liberalism here, we mean the rule of law 
and the constitutional limits set up for taming political power. Anti-liberalism 
or illiberalism, therefore, refers to endeavors to ‘shirk’ these constraints, often 
justified by democratic empowerment (Zakaria 1997).
THE COMPARISON
The reshaping of the political spectrum 
Berlusconi and Orbán have carried out important modifications of the 
political scene and reshaped the party system with long-lasting effect. Both of 
them emerged from a political vacuum, both reorganized the political right in 
their country, and both gave a determinant direction to the changes in the party 
system over a long period. 
Berlusconi entered Italian politics when it was undergoing a radical 
transformation due to both internal and international factors. After the collapse 
of the major parties, Berlusconi offered a center-right, liberal alternative using 
a new, fresh, and easily understandable tone. He reached a coalition agreement 
separately with two parties (the Northern League and the National Alliance) 
that would have never formed a coalition with each other. With the help of this 
strategy he won the election, becoming prime minister of a coalition cabinet 
composed of Forza Italia and the two allies. However, his innovation’s strength 
was also its weakness. As Raniolo (2013: 106) says ‘the first Berlusconi cabinet 
confirmed that electioneering was one matter and that governing was another 
and very different one’. Internal tensions between coalition members appeared 
from the beginning, and being a newcomer in politics (which was rhetorically 
advantageous for Berlusconi during the campaign) also meant having no 
experience in handling political controversies. The government took office on 
10 May 1994, and was obliged to resign before the end of the same year. In spite 
of the failure of the first Berlusconi cabinet, his effect on political competition 
and on the party system has been lasting.
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One popular narrative of the establishment of Italian bipolarism is that 
‘bipolarism and alternation of government are fruits of the political action of 
Silvio Berlusconi’ (Forza Italia 2013b). This implicitly means that after a long 
period without alternation, Italy finally became a modern European democracy. 
But before seeing Berlusconi as a proactive protagonist of this process, it is 
important to note the role of the new, semi-majoritarian electoral system that also 
favored the emergence of two main political blocks at the center. As Pasquino 
notes ‘it would be more appropriate to say that Berlusconi became bipolar by 
default, that is, because he was obliged by the political circumstances and events 
to shape his own ‘pole’ and to structure the electoral and political competition 
around ‘us’ versus ‘them’’ (Pasquino 2007a: 45). 
In addition to the role of the new electoral system and other political 
circumstances, the fact remains that a few months were enough for Berlusconi 
to remold the dynamics of political competition and to consolidate FI’s position 
on the center-right side of Italian political spectrum. The bipolar era lasted 
until the elections of 2013, when a viable movement emerged on the scene. The 
Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, 5 Stars Movement) has been able to create a firm 
third pole more successfully than any other party or coalition during the last 
two decades.
The rise of Viktor Orbán as a political leader and prime minister in Hungary 
is closely connected to his achievement of re-shaping his own party as well 
as the whole political spectrum. After 1994 he entered the political vacuum 
left by the collapse of the center-right MDF through a masterful re-positioning 
of Fidesz from a left-liberal radical youth movement to a national-liberal, 
moderate right-wing party. By the time of the 1998 elections Orbán had become 
the leader of the political right. Having won the election he was able to form 
his first cabinet with his coalition partners from the right of the center. Since 
the SZDSZ, the larger liberal party, joined the Horn government and entered 
an enduring political alliance with the Socialist Party, the left/right conflict 
became a persistent divisive dimension. Hence the liberal center disappeared 
from Hungarian politics.
Orbán, even more successfully than Berlusconi, was able to unify the whole 
political right in Hungary. He successfully used his premiership between 
1998 and 2002 to strengthen his position as a leader of the right. He gradually 
weakened his coalition partners, won their constituencies (Enyedi 2005) and 
either integrated them into Fidesz, or pushed them to the sidelines of politics. 
By the first decade of the twenty-first century, Fidesz had become a highly 
centralized and politically rather homogeneous ‘catch-all’ party. The ‘one flag, 
one camp’ strategy of Orbán contributed to the strong bipolarization of the 
political spectrum (Körösényi 2013) which lasted until 2010. Like Berlusconi, 
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Orbán was successful in preserving his leading role on the right in spite of his 
electoral defeats in 2002 and 2006.
At the 2010 elections, however, Fidesz achieved a landslide victory and gained 
a two-thirds majority in parliament. This critical election (Enyedi and Casal 
Bertoa 2011) abolished the bipolar party system of the previous decade: not only 
did it weaken the socialists and ruin the liberals (who had formed a coalition 
government three times together since 1990), but it produced strong radical right 
(Jobbik) representation in the parliament. This way Fidesz was able to present 
itself as the party of the political center – the ‘central field of force’, as Orbán 
called it. The 2014 elections produced a party system in which the dominant 
party (Fidesz) faces a bipolar opposition: the Socialist party and other left or left 
liberal splinter groups from the left, and the Jobbik from the far right. Thus from 
2010 onwards, Orbán’s Fidesz occupied the center as a dominant party — one 
might even speculate about the emergence of a predominant party system in 
the sense Sartori (1976: 192—201) used the term (Körösényi and Patkós 2017).
To sum up: Berlusconi and Orbán have been the single and unchallenged leaders 
of the center-right coalitions of Italy and Hungary for the last two decades. Both 
entered politics in the same period and achieved political success by breaking 
into the political vacuum left by the collapse of established parties on the right. 
Both of them established a new political party, or movement. Berlusconi entered 
politics as a newcomer when the Italian political system was undergoing deep 
transformation, established the leading party of the political right, and won the 
elections two months after he came on the scene. Orbán, the leader of Fidesz, 
emerged from the radical-alternative, left-liberal field of the political spectrum, 
but moved to the right after the 1994 electoral collapse of the moderate-right 
coalition government. He repositioned his own party in a surprisingly short 
period and reorganized the political right. Both transformed the party systems 
of their countries and contributed to strong ideological bipolarization and the 
creation of a two-block system which lasted for a long period. In turn, from 2010 
onwards we have witnessed diverging tendencies in these established two-block 
systems: in Italy there emerged a new movement as a third pole, M5S, while in 
Hungary, after the ‘earthquake elections’ of 2010, Fidesz held onto its dominant 
position at the following elections in 2014.
Political means: populism and centralization
Besides his populist rhetoric and style, a striking phenomenon was the new 
techniques of party-building and political mobilization Berlusconi used when he 
322
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
ANDRÁS KÖRÖSÉNYI AND VERONIKA PATKÓS
entered politics. His party was organized from above, using techniques of market 
research and involving top managers of Berlusconi’s holdings. Publitalia did the 
lion’s share of the work in the field of political marketing and campaigning, 
as well as in candidate selection (Stille 2012). Beyond that, we find interesting 
another political innovation: the use of pseudo-civic associations designed to 
gain public attention and political capital.
Berlusconi started the movement of Forza Italia! clubs, inaugurating the first 
one in December, 1993, then announced his entrance into politics. The clubs 
were described as autonomous associations with a strong liberal-democratic 
perspective that undertook cultural, social, and in a non-party political sense, 
political activities. The dissemination of Forza Italia! clubs was promoted by 
Berlusconi’s TV channels, which called on every interested citizen to found a local 
club and to be its president. Presumably due to the seemingly non-partisan and 
bottom-up nature of the initiative, it was very successful. Before the 1994 national 
elections, the estimated number of members was around one million (Poli 2001: 
46—47). The clubs played an important role in enhancing the visibility, reputation 
and credibility of Forza Italia, even though they were never integrated into the 
party. 
In the first years, due to its top-down foundation, FI’s party organization was 
weak. During the years in opposition the party managed to reinforce it, but the 
strong and direct relationship between leader and supporters has remained a 
dominant feature of Berlusconi’s party. 
During the 1990s in Hungary, Orbán re-organized Fidesz from a rather 
anarchic, horizontally organized youth organization into a highly centralized 
party controlled from the top. Besides some novelties used in the 1998 campaign, 
Orbán began to apply new, populist mobilization techniques after the 2002 
electoral defeat. He launched the Movements of Civic Circles (Polgári Körök 
Mozgalma) in May 2002, which recruited more than two hundred thousand 
members within one year (Magyar Narancs 2003). Orbán emphasized the 
national, non-party character of his new movement which helped him to widen 
the network of political activists around Fidesz in a country where formal party 
membership had been discredited by the communist regime. This movement 
also helped to keep the morale of Fidesz supporters high during the years in 
opposition.3 
In the autumn of 2006 unprecedentedly large demonstrations were held, and 
violent and prolonged riots broke out against the re-elected Gyurcsány cabinet 
in Budapest due to the leaked ’lying speech’ of the Socialist prime minister. 
Although Gyurcsány survived a vote of confidence in parliament, Orbán was 
3 Civic Circles were established as a variant of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia clubs.
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able to direct the dissatisfaction of the people into constitutional channels. He 
mobilized them against the public policy reforms of the government via the 
means of direct democracy. Fidesz organized a petition for a referendum (held 
in 2008) against three policy initiatives of the Socialist-liberal government 
and won each of them. From 2009 onwards the Forum of Civic-Cooperation 
(Civil Összefogás Fórum), another pseudo-civic satellite organization of Fidesz, 
regularly organized large political rallies to protest left-liberal politics and to 
support Fidesz. In addition to this, several National Consultations (Nemzeti 
Konzultáció) were held when Fidesz was both in government and in opposition, in 
which each citizen received a questionnaire concerning a scheduled government 
public policy initiative or institutional reform plan and could express her/his 
views about it.
To sum up: in both the Italian and Hungarian cases we have witnessed an 
emergence of populist democracy in the sense of process and linkage. Populism 
in this sense is a form of democratic governance that operates without an 
emphasis on party, where the relationship between voters and government is 
unmediated (Mair 2002: 88—89). There is an increased reliance on plebiscitarian 
techniques of winning support. 
It should be emphasized, however, that populist democracy in Italy and 
Hungary did not replace, but supplemented representative or party democracy. 
There has been no shift towards populist democracy in the constitution or in 
government. Institutional means of direct democracy such as recall, referendum, 
bounded mandate, etc. have not been established or strengthened, in spite of 
the fact that Italy witnessed moderate institutional reforms in the Berlusconi 
era, and Hungary radical constitutional engineering in the Orbán era. Although 
populist means were applied in mobilization and in rhetoric, and both Berlusconi 
and Orbán appealed directly to citizens for public approval of specific policy 
measures, no populist means has been applied and introduced in government 
or in the constitution.4 Populism, as process and linkage between leaders and 
citizens, proved to be an instrument of top-down political leadership, rather than 
a means of public deliberation or authoritative decision-making from below.
4  The only exception might be the direct election of the PM in Italy, which was introduced with the 
electoral reform of 2005.  
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Rebuilding the political system5
Two major institutional changes were scheduled by the second cabinet 
(composed of Forza Italia and three smaller parties) during the Berlusconi era: 
the electoral law was successfully changed in 2005, but constitutional reforms 
failed. The main constitutional changes would have involved the marked 
strengthening of the powers of the prime minister at the expense of the president 
of the republic and the parliament, and the devolution of the state and a national 
interest veto on regional acts, but the reform was rejected by the political left and 
also by the vast majority of Italian scholars of constitutional law and political 
science. Finally, it was rejected in a referendum in 2006. Characteristically, the 
planned constitutional reforms, as well as the electoral reform, were strongly 
motivated by partisan interests. Each party leader in Berlusconi’s coalition 
would have gained political advantages. During the process the parties of the 
coalition had to accept certain measures in order to obtain something important 
to them (Bull and Newell 2009: 54, Pasquino 2007a, 2007b). 
The predominantly majoritarian old electoral law was replaced by a ‘bonus-
adjusted proportional’ system, without primaries (Renwick et al. 2009). 
Although in the old system 75 per cent of seats were filled in single-member 
districts and the new system was mostly proportional, the electoral reform 
cannot be interpreted as a clear move towards proportionality. The underlying 
logic of the new system still favored bipolar competition. Two key points that, 
in spite of proportional seat allocation, favored the survival of the two blocks 
were the necessity of forming pre-electoral coalitions with an indication there 
would be a coalition leader (which meant the de facto direct election of the chief 
executive), and a bonus for the winning coalition.
Compared to the institutional reforms characterizing Berlusconi’s policy, 
Orbán carried out more ambitious and robust institutional engineering from 
the incumbent position, especially in his second premiership. The two-thirds 
parliamentary majority achieved at the 2010 elections opened the door for Orbán 
to re-build the whole institutional system of Hungarian politics and achieve 
a ‘second revolution’,6 neglecting the noisy protestations of the diminished 
parliamentary opposition. The new constitution and the several constitutional 
5   In this section we rely on Körösényi and Patkós (2017).
6   Orbán regarded the 1990 democratic transition and the regime it established as a political failure, 
an unfinished and mismanaged project, and tried to differentiate himself and his party from this 
period using various positive and symbolic means. These means have included the introduction of 
a new Fundamental Law to replace the constitution, the renaming of the country from Hungarian 
Republic to Hungary, and a declaration of the new regime as the ‘System of National Cooperation’ 
(Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere).
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amendments passed between 2010 and 2013 re-structured the whole institutional 
fabric of the political system and the state. The prime minister’s power in 
government has been strengthened by various means to an unprecedented level. 
The power of the constitutional court vis-à-vis the government majority was 
constrained and the whole constitutional system of checks and balances was 
re-shaped. Changes have included the centralization of public administration, 
public health care and education, and an increase of government control in 
other areas. The electoral reform of 2012 not only strengthened the majoritarian 
elements in the mixed electoral system but helped Orbán to preserve his two-
thirds parliamentary majority at the 2014 general elections, in spite of having 
lost one-fifth of all votes as compared to 2010. In addition to the institutional 
changes, the Orbán era established a new practice in terms of power-wielding: 
a few consensual elements in parliamentary decision-making were suspended 
(for example, the appointments of members of the constitutional court) or 
bypassed (like the compulsory reconciliation process with major stakeholders 
by introducing the government’s initiatives as bills of individual legislators) and 
the brute force of the supermajority has prevailed. In contrast to the case of 
Berlusconi, Orbán’s institutional reforms mean more than a turn away from 
legal constitutionalism towards political constitutionalism (Bellamy 2007). By 
the extension of  Cardinal Acts7 to more than 40 legislative areas, including 
public policy areas like taxation, pension and the social security system, and the 
appointments of Fidesz loyalists to public offices for 6, 9 or 12 years, Orbán has 
restricted any future governments’ ability to act according to their own public 
policy goals.
To sum up: according to political scientists, the presidentialization of the 
executive has taken place in Italy over the last 25 years. Berlusconi did not 
have a distinguished role in this process, and each government contributed to it 
to some extent (Calise 2005: 91—96). In contrast, the first two cabinets led by 
Orbán played a prominent role in the process of the robust presidentialization 
of the executive that has taken place in Hungary since the democratic transition 
in 1989—1990. These changes are characterized by the centralization of public 
administration and the state, politicization through political patronage, and 
the greater dominance of the prime minister within the government. Both 
Berlusconi and Orbán have established a new era in Italian and Hungarian 
politics, respectively. But due to the constitution-making, the centralization 
of the government and the rebuilding of the state, it is no overstatement to 
characterize Orbán as a founder of a new regime in Hungary. This is a less 
liberal version of democracy with more authoritarian elements. 
7   Cardinal Acts can be passed or amended only by a two-thirds supermajority of parliamentarians.
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Political ideology, public policy and government record 
Comparison of the political ideology, public policy and government record 
of the two political leaders is no easy exercise. Both have operated over a long 
period, and Berlusconi and Orbán became prime minister three times over a 
relatively long time-span, so it is not easy to make an overall assessment of 
either of them, nor to compare their policies. In addition, the ideological saliency 
/ pragmatism of their policies seems to be paradoxical. To make this point clear, 
we rely on Vivian Schmidt’s differentiation between three levels of generality 
of ideas; namely, philosophical, programmatic, and policy ideas (Schmidt 2014: 
194—198). While Orbán has evinced a more characteristic general public 
philosophy, ideology or world view8 than Berlusconi, it is not accompanied by 
strong programmatic ideas or policy paradigms such as neo-Keynesianism or 
neoliberalism. Therefore, his actual public policy has usually become more 
flexible and rather instrumental; it is not defined by any public policy paradigm, 
but developed through process of bricolage, to use Martin Carstensen’s 
concept.9 In contrast, ‘Berlusconi has never articulated the principles inspiring 
his political action in government with reference to a precise political vision. To 
paraphrase de Gaulle, Berlusconi has never attempted to articulate ‘a certain 
idea of Italy’ (Pasquino 2007a: 51). Berlusconi, however, proved to be more 
coherent at the level of programmatic ideas: he remained an adherent of the 
neoliberal paradigm. Therefore his policy ideas remained less ‘elastic’ than 
those of Orbán. Keeping in mind these difficulties, and at the risk of some 
simplification, we now give a brief overview of the governmental philosophy, 
political ideas, public policy attitude, and style of the two political leaders.
Governmental philosophy. The approach of Berlusconi and Orbán to politics 
and governance also has a few similarities. First, both of them give priority 
to efficient government over representation and they regard parliament as an 
instrument of government rather than as an institution of fair representation. 
Second, they prefer quick decisions rather than lengthy consultation with 
stakeholders. Third, they reject liberal constitutionalism in which the ‘rule 
8   Orbán appeared in politics as a young radical anti-communist politician at the end of the 1980s. But 
he had turned away from these radical, anti-clerical and liberal principles towards conservative, 
nationalist, Christian and authoritarian values and principles by the late 1990s. Orbán has always 
tried to articulate principles that legitimize his policy. His concept of illiberal democracy might be 
connected to his general critique of Western civilization.
9   Bricolage ‘entails the rearrangement of elements that are already at hand, but it may also entail 
the blending in of new elements that have diffused from elsewhere’ (Carstensen 2011, 154). 
Bricolage means weaving together ideational elements from different paradigms and logics, to 
effect heterogeneous sets of policy ideas (Carstensen 2011, 157).
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of law’ prevails over the ‘rule of men’. Instead, they emphasize the role of 
individual leaders in politics and the individual responsibility of incumbents 
and decision-makers. ‘Who governs’: that is what matters, rather than precise 
legal norms and institutions. Finally, they also share a procedural approach to 
law and regard it purely as an instrument of politics. As we saw during the 
second Orbán cabinet (2010—2014), the constitution and the newly introduced 
Fundamental Law were amended a total of 18 times, while in the case of Italy, 
Berlusconi’s ad personam laws are also famous examples of this practice.10 But 
there are obvious differences as well. While the self-made millionaire Berlusconi 
is an individualist and a market liberal who believes in entrepreneurship and 
has popularized a society in which everybody is responsible for their own fate 
(i.e. places emphasis on individual achievement), Orbán believes in active state 
intervention. 
Ideology, values and culture. A striking similarity between Berlusconi and 
Orbán is their strong anti-communism, which has characterized their political 
thinking throughout their careers. This rigorous anti-communist stance 
gradually grew into an offensive and combatant policy vis-à-vis the left and left-
liberals in general. In contrast to Berlusconi’s liberal perceptions, the state is 
not neutral for Orbán, but strongly value-laden. Although both Berlusconi and 
Orbán are conservative-value politicians who place emphasis on Christian and 
family values, there are striking differences between them. Unlike Berlusconi, 
Orbán has been committed to implementing Christian and conservative values 
in public policy and even into the Fundamental Law as well (e.g. same-sex 
marriage is prohibited, a church law, media law, and family support schemes 
have been introduced). While Orbán praises positive energy rooted in collective 
endeavor, and his national conservative, historicizing attitude has a strong 
influence on the field of cultural policy, Berlusconi, as a media tycoon and 
owner of commercial television channels, emphasizes individual endeavor and 
is a champion of infotainment culture, individualism and consumerism. The 
scandals concerning his private life and his personal style have also contributed 
to the radical transformation of popular culture and public discourse after a long 
period of the strict, anti-consumerist and prudish cultural policy of the First 
Republic (Stille 2012).
Populism, anti-elitism and rhetoric. Both Berlusconi and Orbán renewed 
the political language of public discourse in their own countries and started to 
use an optimistic and self-aware tone. Berlusconi broke with the sophisticated 
political language used by the political class of the First Republic and began 
10   www.parlament.hu/fotitkar/alkotmany/modositasok.htm and 
www.parlament.hu/fotitkar/alkotmany/alaptv_modositasai.htm
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to use simple language, the language of ordinary people. For the first time in 
post-Second World War Italian politics he emphasized that ‘Italians are good 
just as they are’, and he stated that if there were problems in society, it was 
the fault of institutions and politicians (Orsina 2013: 97—105). In his speeches 
he has frequently used positive words (such as miracle, trust, dream, love and 
happiness) and statements like ‘Forza Italia is the victory of love over hate and 
envy’ or that his party is the ‘party of love’ (Forza Italia 2013a).
The linguistic shift in Hungary was also significant, but different. Orbán 
broke with the modernist, technocratic and ‘sociological’ language which had 
dominated Hungarian political discourse since the late-communist period11 
(Szűcs 2012) and, like Berlusconi, used a vocabulary closer to the language 
of the ordinary people. Orbán represents a self-aware, voluntarist and optimist 
attitude. He rejects the defeatist attitude of Hungarian left-liberal politicians 
who have fostered a complex of inferiority with regard to the West regarding 
‘underdeveloped’ Hungarian political culture. 
The emotional tone, and the usage of a new, simple language, easily intelligible 
to ordinary people, are important novelties of both politicians’ political styles 
and appearances. These features are usually accompanied by populist rhetoric, 
and also accompanied by populism in a substantive sense as well. Their rhetoric 
has had strong anti-establishment elements and both actors have often justified 
their policy by referring to the will of the people vis-à-vis corrupt political elites. 
Berlusconi signed a contract with the Italians during the campaigns of 2001 
and 2008, and Orbán also often referred to the 2010 elections as the birth of a 
new social contract, which was later declared by the newly elected Hungarian 
parliament as well.12 Their political messages have had an anti-political tone 
(Pasquino 2007a; Campus 2006). Appeals against existing parties, institutions 
and the political class, and disdain for rules and procedures are both in line with 
the political mentalities of the Italian and Hungarian populations.
National identity and foreign policy. Due to traditionally strong local and 
regional identities and deep cultural and economic differences, Italian national 
identity has been fairly weak since the unification of the country. With the 
foundation of Forza Italia, Berlusconi identified one of the very few consensually 
positive constituents of national pride, the Italian national football team, which 
inspired his party’s name and symbols. During his twenty-year presence in 
politics, Berlusconi contributed to the strengthening of national identity, but his 
nationalism is a sort of ‘discreet nationalism’. 
11   This language, used by the post-communist (socialist) and liberal elite, dominated political 
discourse until the end of the 1990s.
12 www.kormany.hu/download/d/56/00000/politikai_nyilatkozat.pdf
329
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
LIBERAL AND ILLIBERAL POPULISM
In contrast, Orbán’s political credo includes a strong national identity and also 
concern for Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries. From 2010 onwards 
the Orbán cabinet has been engaged in a continuous ‘freedom fight’ against 
Brussels. Orbán has successfully redirected traditional Hungarian ressentiment 
towards the great powers and the West against the European Union. Orbán, who 
was the first to demand in Hungary in 1989 that the occupying Russian troops 
should leave the country, has followed a pro-Russian policy within the EU since 
2010. Both politicians are Euroskeptics, but Orbán is so to a much greater extent. 
While Berlusconi is strongly committed to Euroatlantic cooperation, Orbán 
emphasizes national sovereignty in policy-making within the European Union, 
but his Euroscepticism is also supplemented with elements of anti-globalism 
and with less enthusiastic support for Atlantic relations.
Economic policy. Both leaders reject egalitarianism and the social welfare 
policies of the left, and their governments have contributed to some extent 
to reducing the welfare state. The middle class and the upper-middle class 
are the beneficiaries of their economic and social policies. Tax cuts, fighting 
unemployment and creating new jobs are among the top priorities of both 
leaders’ electoral programs.
While Berlusconi can be characterized by his liberal economic policy attitude 
and pro-consumerism, Orbán condemns free market liberalism, globalized 
capitalism and multinational financial institutions. From 2010 onwards he 
promoted policy which gives a strong role to the state in the economy, including 
massive state ownership in sectors like energy, telecommunication and public 
utilities. In Orbán’s view, both individuals and the state are responsible for 
individual well-being. For instance, in employment policy he prefers community 
service to aid for the unemployed, but claims that it is the responsibility of the 
state to provide work for everybody (after 2010 the Orbán cabinet introduced a 
massive community service program). 
From 2010 onwards Orbán became a champion of a ‘workfare state’ and full 
employment instead of a welfare state, and he favors marked state intervention 
in the economy. He has introduced extraordinary measures, but made them 
permanent as part of a larger goal to restructure social-economic redistribution 
in Hungary. For example, the controversial crisis tax on banking was designed 
not only to balance the budget, but to decrease foreign ownership in the banking 
sector to below 50 per cent. 
Berlusconi firmly believes in entrepreneurship and in the free market. Job 
creation has also appeared in his famous contracts with the Italians. Otherwise, 
the Berlusconi cabinets have made little effort either to reduce the budget deficit 
and Italy’s enormous public debt or to combat tax evasion (Di Quirico 2010). 
Compared to Berlusconi’s ‘easy-going’ attitude, however, Orbán’s fiscal policy 
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is more conservative: as PM he followed a policy of balancing the budget and 
fought to reduce the foreign indebtedness of the country. 
The global financial crisis has had a serious and lasting effect on both 
countries, but the two leaders’ narratives on this topic have been completely 
different. Berlusconi, having been in office, tried to deny the existence of the 
crisis13 — or at least, to downplay the importance of it. In contrast, Orbán 
dramatized the political situation. He used a vehement crisis narrative to justify 
extraordinary political measures and interpreted the crisis as not exclusively 
economic in nature, representing it as evidence of the deep political and moral 
crisis of Western civilization.
Both Italy and Hungary can be characterized by a strong fusion of politics and 
business. Berlusconi was often criticized for his conflict of interests — namely, 
for subordinating public interest to his personal business and political interests. 
Having an oligarch as prime minister weakens public morale and democracy. 
In Hungary, the fusion of politics and business is fostered from the opposite 
side. Unlike in Italy when the oligarch Berlusconi struggled for political power 
to secure his business and personal positions, in Hungary Orbán  used political 
means to build up a capitalist class linked closely to party politics and to the 
state. Orbán’s policy of strong state intervention in the economy aims at, 
among other things, replacing the post-communist elite and reinforcing the new 
counter-elite. This policy, however, has strengthened oligarchic tendencies such 
as giving state contracts to loyal businessmen and changing rules in an ad hoc 
way to put ‘friendly’ firms and capitalists in an advantageous position.
ANALYSIS  
In the final part of this article we review the results of the comparison, then 
we respond to the two analytical questions of the paper. Finally, we draw some 
conclusions.
The comparison. We draw a distinction between the three political dimensions: 
polity, politics, and policy. On basis of the results of the comparison above, we 
assert that the leadership activity and achievement of Berlusconi and Orbán is 
rather similar in the dimension of politics, but in the dimensions of polity and 
policy we find more differences than similarities. Berlusconi and Orbán are both 
13   As often cited, Berlusconi said at a press conference that ‘Life in Italy is the life of a wealthy 
country: consumption hasn’t diminished, it’s hard to find seats on planes, our restaurants are full 
of people.’ (Libero Quotidiano 2011)
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innovative politicians who have effected massive changes in the dimension of 
politics: they have applied new tactics in the relationship with their followers 
and have profoundly transformed the party system and the political spectrum. 
Otherwise, Berlusconi has been less effective in the fulfilment of his policy 
goals (see Pasquino 2012: 140), and, with the exception of electoral reform, has 
failed to carry out major institutional (constitutional) reform. In contrast, Orbán 
has been more effective at transforming policy means and priorities, and has 
been more successful at achieving wider political goals such as redefining the 
boundaries between state and society, constitution-making, and transforming 
the electoral system and other elements of the institutional political system. The 
results of the comparison are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 The effect of Berlusconi and Orbán on the three political dimensions
Political dimensions Berlusconi Orbán
Politics
(1) Party system and political spectrum* + +
(2) Political means + +
Polity (3) Political institution system - +
Policy (4) Policy and wider political goals - +
*Electoral reforms are included in this category.
Populism. Common to Berlusconi and Orbán is the populist nature of their 
politics and leadership. We found that both pursued populist strategies in the 
ideological sense and in the sense of populism as process and linkage, but they 
did not integrate elements of direct democracy into the respective constitutional 
systems. In this respect, their activity has been different from some previous 
examples of populism (e.g. in the United States in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, or the Fifth Republic of de Gaulle). They have often justified 
their policies by referring to the will of the people vis-à-vis elite politics, but 
their populism is an instrument of a top-down political leadership rather than a 
concrete institutionalization of decision-making by the people.
Direction of change. Reviewing their political activities (Table 2) we can state 
that without Berlusconi and Orbán, Italian and Hungarian politics would have 
been decidedly different. As we can see, both Berlusconi and Orbán played a 
prominent role in speeding up the tendency to personalize the elections. To sum 
up, they have contributed to a large extent to the presidentialization process 
(Poguntke and Webb, 2005). Although presidentialization has proved to be a 
general phenomenon in European politics, Berlusconi and Orbán have played 
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an outstanding role in this field. What makes their performance exceptional is 
especially the extent of the personalization of Berlusconi’s party and electoral 
campaign, and the extent of the presidentialization of the executive by Orbán 
(Calise 2005; Fabbrini 2012; Körösényi 2001). Orbán’s second and third terms 
might be labelled ‘elected dictatorship’, since his control of the party, the 
executive and the legislature has reached an extraordinarily high level, and his 
power and influence now extend over the sphere of finance and the economy. 
Table 2  Overview of the politics of Berlusconi and Orbán
Berlusconi Orbán
Similarities
Weakening of the rule of law Weakening of the rule of law
Populist Populist
Personalization and presidentialization Personalization and presidentialization
New era (dimension of politics) New era (dimension of politics)
Differences
Market-liberal and capitalist Etatist and anti-capitalist
Rather liberal (values, attitudes) Strong anti-liberal elements (values, attitudes)
Normal politics Extraordinary politics
Transactive leader Transformational  leader
Regime maintainer (dimension of 
polity) Regime founder (dimension of polity)
The substantive emptiness of their populist ideology (‘thin ideology’) is 
confirmed by our findings in the sense that while we found identical features in the 
political methods and means of Berlusconi and Orbán, we also identified significant 
differences in the content of their ideologies and political programs. Their attitude 
to liberalism is completely different. ‘Berlusconism’, as Orsina says, is an ‘emulsion 
of liberalism and populism’ (Orsina 2013: 129). Berlusconi used the legislature to 
gain personal advantages, but his worldview is rather liberal; this is captured in 
individualist values, in his firm faith in civil society, and in economic preferences 
for markets and liberal capitalism. He weakened the rule of law by ad personam 
legislation, but did not use similar means to transform the political regime. Orbán, by 
contrast, weakened constitutional limitations on his power in a systematic manner.14 
Since Orbán entered into office in 2010, the liberal-constitutionalist elements of 
the Hungarian constitution have been markedly weakened. The economic policy 
14  For the illiberal elements of the Fundamental Law introduced by the Orbán cabinet from 2012, see 
Bánkuti et. al 2012; Jenne and Mudde 2012.
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followed by Orbán has strong etatist, anti-capitalist and anti-market elements, so it 
has proved to be in many aspects anti-liberal. His political discourse and rhetoric 
may also be characterized by his anti-liberalism. 
The strong similarities in the personalization of politics and their populism 
conceal crucial differences in personal political aims and ambitions, leadership 
types, public policy attitudes, relations to the status quo and institutional and 
policy reforms. The differences may be traced back to the divergence in their 
career paths. Unlike Orbán, who became a professional politician during the 
years of democratization of Hungary, Berlusconi broke into politics as an 
outsider, well-known for his professionalism and business expertise, and 
with a considerable amount of economic capital. While the fame he gained 
as a businessman has been a fundamental resource for his political success, 
his personal wealth and his media empire were also of major importance. The 
showman, however, is veiling a socially conservative, status-quo-oriented 
attitude. His political career path and personal aims (to defend personal business 
interests and overcome the legal procedures against him) also explain his more 
right-leaning political attitude (i.e. his determination to block the communist 
party and the left). The scope and extent of political changes in institutions, 
state, and society proved to be rather limited in Berlusconi’s case. Changes 
include the electoral arena, the electoral law and the party system, but only 
minor changes have been made to government institutions. His most ambitious 
constitutional reform plan failed in 2006. All in all, the policy and legislative 
measures of Berlusconi cabinets remained within the frameworks of ‘normal 
politics’, and also within the borders of conventional bürgerliche politics. The 
policy and politics of Orbán from 2010 onwards, in contrast, have transcended 
both of these borders, and his political methods recall times of ‘extraordinary 
politics’ (Agamben 2005; Boin et al. 2012; Kalyvas 2008).
The Berlusconi era brought revolutionary changes in terms of electoral 
campaigns, reform of the style and language of politics, the party system and 
links to the people, and in some respects was a model which inspired the politics 
of Orbán. But the changes carried out to the Italian system did not include 
changes to the machinery of the state and redistribution of income and wealth, 
and modification of the relation between state and society. In contrast, Orbán’s 
ambitions transcend the party system and have included changes to the whole 
political system, such as reforms of the state and changes to the relation between 
state and society. Changes since 2010 have included modifications to the 
whole system of government, public administration, the constitution, relations 
between state and economy, and the redistribution of income and wealth. Orbán 
has gone much further in changing the political system and in institutionalizing 
his power, and the robustness of these changes is far beyond that of Berlusconi’s. 
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He has not merely launched a new era in Hungarian politics, like Berlusconi 
in Italy, but since 2010 has become the founder of a new political regime; a 
democracy with strong authoritarian element.
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